How can a small special interest group successfully get an inefficient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available for lobbying? We consider a simple model of collusive organizations that provide a public good in the form of effort and have a fixed cost per member of acting collusively. Our key result is that the willingness of such a group to pay for a given prize depends on whether the prize is fungible -that is, whether the prize can be used to pay for itself. If the prize is fungible, as in the case of a transfer payment, a smaller group always has an advantage. If the prize is non-fungible -civil rights for example -willingness to pay first increases then decreases with the size of the group. We use the theory to study agenda setting both with and without blackmail by the politician showing that in general the small group is not too greedy: when it wins it optimally chooses to pre-empt the large group by choosing a prize small enough to equal the large group participation cost.
Introduction
There is a basic puzzle about lobbying: how can a small special interest group successfully get an inecient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available for lobbying? Olson (1982) and others such as Becker (1983) have argued that this is because small groups are likely to be more eective than large groups but without providing much in the way of a theory about why this might be the case, and whether there are exceptions. By contrast empirical results on the relation between group size and strength in this case are mixed, see, for example, the survey by Potters and Sloof (1996) . In this paper we examine a simple model where two groups of dierent size compete for a prize. The prize to a group takes the form of a transfer from the other group, and in trying to win the transfer the groups bribe a politician by oering him a payment.
To solve the public good problem of contribution the groups must pay a xed cost per member.
A formal model of monitoring leading to this result can be found in Levine and Modica (2016) .
Here we explore conditions under which a small group is and is not more eective than their larger rival. Our main nding is that fungibility -whether the prize can be used to pay for itself -plays a key role. For example monetary subsidies such as farm subsidies are fungible since they can be used to pay the politicians who provide the subsidies, while benets such as civil rights are not fungible as they do not increase the resources available for lobbying. In the case of a fungible prize we nd that the idea that smaller groups are more eective is basically correct. In the case of a non-fungible prize it is true only up to a point: a group that is too small lacks the resources to submit a high bid, so that the eectiveness initially increases with group size; but then eventually decreases.
3 In our conclusion we present some evidence that indeed small groups are much more eective at garnering fungible than non-fungible prizes.
Our model of lobbying is similar to those used in earlier work such as Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) and Rama and Tabellini (1998) in that we include the possibility that lobbyists purchase inuence in a menu auction. Those papers consider lobbies that compete with each other such as trade-unions and business groups and do not analyze the eect of group size. In this work the general public is represented only indirectly in the form of a preference by government ocials for eciency. Here we are instead interested specically about why a small special interest group can out lobby a larger general interest group. Why do bankers and farmers win over taxpayers?
We apply the model also to agenda setting, considering that either group can choose the size of the prize. If the small group can set the agenda we nd that it will generally choose a relatively small prize -some subsequent back of the envelope calculations concerning farm subsidies show that this is plausible. If the large group can set the agenda fungibility plays a key role. In the case of a fungible prize the large group cannot get the prize. In the case of a non-fungible prize the large group will choose a very large prize. We also consider the role of the politician. We focus on 3 Of course dierent models may deliver dierent predictions. Dixit (2004) , Chapter 3 for example considers a two-period model of bilateral trading where misbehavior by a given individual in the rst random match can be punished if her second partner knows that when the second match occurs. Assuming that this information is harder to come the larger the group yields the result that larger groups are less capable of enforcing fair trade.
a case where the politician must aliate with one of the lobbies prior to agenda setting. When this is not the case the politician may blackmail the lobbies by threatening each with the agenda of the other if they do not pay up. In practice this is probably dangerous, and we show that in some circumstances it will result in the lobbies colluding to get rid of the politician.
The model potentially provides an explanation of the following paradox: Olson (1965) and others provide substantial evidence that small groups are eective at winning subsidies while larger groups are not. However we also observe frequently the suppression of minority rights by a majority;
here the larger group trying to deny rights seems much more eective than the smaller group trying to keep their rights. We propose that the reason is due to the role of fungibility -small groups are eective in garnering small prizes regardless of fungibility, while large groups are eective only in garnering large non-fungible prizes -and civil rights seem to be in that category.
The literature on lobbying and other interest groups is large. Generally these models have fallen into four categories. Some treat the strength of the group as a black box and proceed with a working assumption, generally one in which strength decreases with size (Olson (1965 ), Becker (1983 ), Becker (1986 ), or in the case of Acemoglu (2001) that strength increases with group size for a relatively small and a relatively large group.
4
A second class of models treats collusive groups as individuals -eectively ignoring internal incentive constraints -and focuses instead on information dierences between the groups: examples are Nti (1999) , Persson and Tabellini (2002) , Kroszner and Stratman (1998) , Laont and Tirole (1991) , Austen Smith and Wright (1992), Banks and Weingast (1992) , Damania, Frederiksson and Mani (2004) , Green and Laont (1979), Laont (2000) and Di Porto, Persico and Sahuguent (2013) . Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) is similar, but allows the endogenous possibility that groups either act non-collusively, or collusively as a single individual. A few papers assume that leaders of the group can distribute benets dierentially (this may or may not be what Olson (1965) has in mind by selective incentives 5 ) so that there is no public goods problem: see for example Nitzan and Ueda (2011) and Uhlaner (1989) . Finally Pecorino (2009 ), Lohmann (1998 , Esteban and Ray (2001) and Esteban, J. and J. Sakovics (2003) treat the problem of individual contribution within a group as a voluntary public goods contribution problem. None of these papers addresses the issue of fungibility. We should also mention Mitra (1999) , that goes in the direction opposite of ours: the paper assumes a xed cost of forming a group -in contrast to our conclusion that there is a xed cost per person in the group -so the more people there are the easier it is to overcome the xed cost.
4 This is consistent with our results, since we show that strength increases with size for a small group, and for a relatively large group, the opposition is small, and therefore weak.
5
Olson's concept is a bit slippery. He may have in mind people who are not in a group beneting from the activity of the group -although this view of voluntary group participation runs somewhat counter to his notion of what constitutes a group. He argues that the group should devise auxiliary services (free lawyers, insurance) which selectively benet only group members. It is not entirely clear why it would not be better to free ride on the group and pay directly for the auxiliary services, unless the group has some cost advantage in providing those services. In our setting members to not have the option of leaving the group -which is to say that they can not avoid being punished by group members. For example, farmers cannot avoid being shunned by neighboring farmers by refusing to join a farm association.
The Model
There are three agents, k ∈ {S, L, P }. The rst two agents are collusive lobbying groups where S means small and L means large and the number of members in group k is N k where N S < N L .
The third agent is a politician.
The Economic Environment
Transfer payments between the three agents are possible. The status quo is that all agents get 0. Each group k can make a transfer V k to the other group which receives βV k where 1 > β > 0 is the eciency of the transfer. Any group that is not making a transfer to the other group may make a payment p k ≥ 0 to the politician. 6 In order to make a strictly positive payment to the politician the group must incur a cost cN k where 1 > c > 0 is a per member cost of organizing and enforcing the payment from group members. That is, we follow Olson (1965) in recognizing that the groups face a public good problem and follow Levine and Modica (2016) in assuming that this can be overcome by a monitoring schemes that has a xed cost per group member that must be monitored. Utility is linear in these payments and transfers.
Feasible transfer payments are subject to resource constraints. There are two types of resources: fungible resources are valued equally by all three groups -they represent money, goods or services.
Non-fungible resources are valued only by the lobbying groups. The represent rights, for example, the right to bear arms, to have an abortion, to marry, to sit at the front of the bus and so forth.
The politician must receive fungible resources. We consider two dierent economic environments:
the case in which all resources are fungible and the case in which the transfer payments are made entirely from non-fungible resources. In both cases each group member is endowed with a unit of fungible resources which can be used to make payments to the politician and for organizing the group. In the non-fungible case these fungible resources are not used to make transfers and each group member is also endowed with ν units of resources that can be used only to make transfers.
We limit attention to the case where ν > 1 so that more non-fungible resources are available than fungible resources.
Specically the rst resource constraint is that the transfer from group k must satisfy V k ≤ νN k where we take ν = 1 in the fungible case. Transfer payments to the politician must come from fungible resources, so in the non-fungible case the payment must satisfy p k ≤ (1 − c)N k . In the fungible case the transfers V −k from the other group are fungible and may also used to pay the politician so the payment must satisfy p k ≤ (1−c)N k +βV −k . It is useful to use the dummy variable ψ ∈ {0, 1} to denote whether the environment is fungible or not, where 1 means fungible, so that for k ∈ {S, L} we may write the resource constraint for paying the politician as p k ≤ (1−c)N k +ψβV −k .
6 Note that if the payment is split among a number of politicians as long as the particular politician in question receives a xed share this does not change his incentives.
Standard Allocation Mechanisms
We rst consider what happens when a particular agenda is set in the sense that a proposal is on the table to transfer a given amount V −a from group −a to the agenda setter group a and the politician must decide whether or not to implement the proposal. We regard the politician as a seller who sells his decision (yes or no) to one of the groups -who we regard as buyers -in exchange for payment. Consider ve standard mechanisms that the politician might use: an all-pay auction, a second price sealed bid auction, a rst price sealed bid auction, a menu auction or a take-it-or-leave-it demand. In an all-pay auction, rst analyzed by Hillman and Riley (1989) , both groups submit bids, the highest bid wins -so if a wins then the proposal is implemented and if −a wins it is not -and both groups pay their bid. In a second price sealed bid auction -which is similar to a rst price oral auction -both groups submit bids, the highest bid wins, and the winning group pays the bid of the losing group. In a rst price sealed bid auction both groups submit bids, the highest bid wins and the winning bid pays their own bid. In a menu auction each group places a bid for both winning and losing and pays the winning bid if they win and the losing bid if they lose.
Menu auctions, also known as common agency, 7 originally introduced in Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) , are commonly studied mechanisms in the literature on buying inuence such as Grossman and Helpman (1992) Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) Grossman and Helpman (2001) or Rama and Tabellini (1998). With a take-it-or-leave-it demand the politician designates a group to whom the demand is made and sets a bid and if the group meets that bid they win and pay the bid, otherwise they lose and pay nothing. So if the politician makes a take-it-or-leave-it demand to a and the group meets the demand the bid is paid and the proposal is implemented; if it does not meet the demand neither group pays anything and the proposal is not implemented. If the take-it-or-leave-it demand is addressed to −a and the group meets the demand the bid is paid and the proposal is not implemented; if it does not meet the demand neither group pays anything and the proposal by a is implemented.
It is useful here to contrast lobbying with voting, since lobbying, to a certain extent, is voting with money. In voting the mechanism is certainly that of the all-pay auction -that is the groups turn out their voters (their bids) and the highest bid wins. Yet the losing party also has to bear the cost of turning out their voters despite the fact they do not get the prize. Lobbying through campaign contributions may have a similar avor, as campaign contributions may be made in advance of political favors being granted, and potentially both groups may contribute to the politicians campaign. However, many payments to politicians are made either ex post or contemporaneously -for example, jobs after the politician leaves oce, jobs for relatives of the politician, donations to future campaigns, and of course outright bribes either in the form of cash or favors. Hence, unlike voting, it makes sense to think of mechanisms where payment is made only if the favor is delivered as well as the all-pay auction.
7 Common agency introduced in Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) is conceptually similar to a menu auction but assume that bidders are not constrained to make non-negative bids. This model has not been widely used in the political economy literature and we do not examine it here.
To analyze these ve mechanisms it is useful to introduce the concept of willingness to pay, as measured, for example, by a Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964) elicitation mechanism. Let U a = βV −a for the agenda setter and U −a = V −a for the other group denote the respective value of winning to each group. Let ψ a = ψ for the agenda setter and let ψ −a = 0. Then total willingness to pay of group k is given by
In the case of the agenda setter pursuing a fungible prize this reduces to
which is decreasing in N k -the basic Olsonian idea that larger groups are less eective because they face a stronger public goods problem. In the remaining cases, however, we have W k = min{(1 − c)N k , max{0, U k − cN k }} which for small N k increases linearly with N k so that very small groups are ineective due to their lack of resources for bidding. For these cases there is an optimal group size neither too big nor too small that maximizes willingness to pay.
Remark. A natural question is why since a smaller group faces a smaller problem (here in terms of xed cost) a larger group does not just act like a smaller group in order to increase its willingness to pay. But a subgroup of size M k < N k would only receive a share of the prize:
the answer is straightforward: the willingness of the subgroup to pay is
so that the willingness of the subgroup to pay is always a fraction M k /N k of the willingness of the entire group to pay.
We can now characterize equilibrium for each of the ve mechanisms, where we use standard renements. Call the group d with the least willingness to pay the disadvantaged group and the group −d the advantaged group.
Theorem 1. Suppose that W a > 0. In the all-pay auction there is a unique Nash equilibrium which is in mixed strategies. The advantaged group plays uniformly on (0, W d ], the disadvantaged group does not bid with probability
and places the remaining probability uniformly on
The expected payment to the politician is
Group −d gets an expected utility of W −d − W d and group d gets nothing. In the second-price auction there is a unique equilibrium in which the groups use weakly undominated strategies: both groups bid their willingness to pay and the expected payment to the politician is W d and the expected utility of the two groups is exactly the same as in the all-pay auction. In the rst price auction and the menu auction there is a unique truthful equilibrium in which the two groups both bid W d , the advantaged group wins and the expected payment to the politician and the expected utility of both groups is identical to that in the second price auction. In the take-it-or-leave-it demand case the politician charges group −d its willingness to pay W −d .
Remark. These are all known results. The all-pay auction is discussed in Hillman and Riley (1989) and Levine and Mattozi (2016) . The take-it-or-leave-it demand and second price auctions are discussed in most textbooks. For the menu auction, truthfulness as introduced in Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) requires that a bid of zero be placed for losing. Hence with two alternatives it is the same as a rst price auction. Truthfulness further requires that the loser bid their value.
Hence the advantaged group should bid just a bit more than the disadvantaged party and win, and in the limit should win by placing the same bid.
We should emphasize rst that the widespread equivalence of the dierent auctions is primarily because values are commonly known, while most of the auction literature considers the far more dicult case in which values are private information. Two summarize: the disadvantaged group never gets anything. Otherwise there are three cases: the take-it-or-leave it demand, the all-pay auction and the second price, rst price and menu actions which are all the same. The take-it-orleave it demand is best for the politician and worst for the advantaged group. The advantaged group is indierent between all the dierent auctions, while the politician dislikes the all-pay auction.
Since everyone agrees or is indierent to one of the rst price, second price or menu auctions over the all-pay auction, we assume that the all pay auction is not used. Since the rst price, second price and menu auctions are all the same, for concreteness and simplicity we focus on the second price auction.
The Mixed Mechanism
Between the second-price auction and the take-it-or-leave-it demand the politician obviously does better with the take-it-or-leave-it demand and the advantaged group does better with the second price auction. How much rent can the politician in fact extract from the two groups? On the one hand it seems that the politician should be able to extract at least what he can get in a second-price auction by playing the groups against one another. On the other hand the groups may resist a take-it-or-leave-it demand that leaves them with no possibility of surplus. In eect the answer depends upon the bargaining power of the politician. One simple way to capture this idea in a simple game form is to use a mechanism that randomizes between a second-price auction and a take-it-or-leave-it demand. That is, we can think of all three agents submitting bids p S , p L , p P , with the politician also designating one of the groups as a target τ ∈ {S, L} for his bid. With probability 1 > α > 0 the game is determined by whether group τ has bid enough to meet the politician's demand (bid) as with a take-it-or-leave-it demand, while with probability 1 − α the game is determined by the bids of the two groups as in a second-price auction.
To understand how this mechanism works notice that the amount that either group pays for winning is independent of its bid. The targeted group faces a randomly drawn price equal to p −τ with probability 1 − α and equal to p P with probability α, wins if its bid p τ is at least equal to the randomly drawn price, but pays only the randomly drawn price. If it wins, the proposed transfer does or does not take place as the targeted group is the agenda setter or not. If τ loses the opposite happens: the agenda is implemented i τ = −a. In this case if τ loses to the politician the agenda setter obtains the transfer for free. Note that here losing must mean the opponent wins which is why when the non-agenda setter is targeted and loses the take-it-or-leave it auction the agenda setter must get the transfer for free.
In the case of the non-targeted group with probability α its bid does not matter, although it may get its preferred policy implemented for free if the targeted group falls short in the bidding against the politician. With probability 1 − α it wins if and only if its own bid p τ ≥ p −τ -that is, it faces a second-price auction.
Since -regardless of whether a group is targeted or not -the amount that it pays for winning is independent of its bid, it is weakly dominant for both groups to bid their willingness-to-pay. Given that, the only possible equilibrium play of the politician is to target the advantaged group τ = −d
and to bid p P = W −d .
Agenda Setting
Transfers are determined by bargaining between the three agents. Specically we consider the following game-form:
1. The politician chooses a group a ∈ {S, L} to aliate with. The group chosen is called the agenda setter.
2. The agenda setter may opt out and the status quo remains, or may propose an agenda for the amount of transfer 0 ≤ V −a ≤ νN −a to be paid by the other group.
3. All three agents submit bids p k . The politician designates a target group τ ∈ {a, −a} for his bid. The bids should satisfy
4. If the two groups bid zero the status quo remains. Otherwise, with probability α the price to be paid to the politician is his bid p P and with probability 1 − α it is the lowest bid. When the price is the bid of the politician τ wins and pays p P if and only if his bid is at least that of the politician: p τ ≥ p P ; otherwise the politician is not paid and group −τ wins. When the price is the lowest bid the highest bidder wins, and in case of a tie the agenda setter wins; in both cases the politician is paid the price by the winner.
5. If the non-agenda setter wins the status quo remains. If agenda setter wins the transfer is made.
The notion of equilibrium is subgame perfect equilibrium with three mild renements: (1) no player plays a weakly dominated strategy, (2) if the agenda setter is indierent to submitting a bid she does not do so, and (3) if the politician is indierent between targeting the two groups she targets the agenda setter. The rst assumption is self-explanatory and leads to the groups bidding their value. The second can be viewed as a lexicographic preference for not bidding that arises from a small cost of preparing a bid. The third can be viewed as a mild ability of the politician to commit to the group to which she aliates.
Agenda Setting Equilibrium
We say that the agenda setter a has a winning agenda if there is a feasible choice V −a ≤ νN −a for which the agenda setter bid/willingness to pay is greater than that of the non-agenda setter W a > W −a . The optimal agenda is a winning agenda for which the dierence in willingness to pay is the greatest, since the net utility of the agenda setter is increasing in that dierence and equal
Notice that in case of equal willingness to pay the agenda setter earns zero, so will choose to opt out. In Appendix 1 we prove Theorem 2. If the large group has a winning agenda the optimal agenda is νN S ; if the small group has a winning agenda its optimal agenda is cN L . In the fungible case: if β ≤ N S /N L both groups opt out; otherwise the politician aliates with the small group.
In the non-fungible case: when βν > (1 − c) + cN L /N S the politician aliates with the large group; when νN S /N L < βν ≤ (1 − c) + cN L /N S the politician aliates with the small group; and otherwise both groups opt out. The bids are given in the following table: 
If the transfer is too inecient (β small) the status quo is maintained. The overall message is that fungible issues or low stakes (ν small) favor the small group while non-fungible issues with high stakes favor the large group. When it wins the small group is not too greedy in the sense that it asks only for cN L while it could ask for as much as N L ; by contrast the large group, unlike the small group, when it wins asks the most it can possibly get. Moreover, amount that the small group wins cN L is increasing in the xed cost c. Notice too that only relative group size matters, the absolute size of groups is irrelevant. 8 The reader may notice that the result also implies that holding all else xed in the non-fungible case, if the small group is small enough relative to the large group it will win. This may seem to go against the main theme of the paper, but remember we consider only two groups and take group sizes as given. We cannot say, therefore, that it would not be advantageous for several groups to join forces. Moreover, if the cost of forming a group is non-null, as in Mitra (1999) , the groups we actually observe cannot be too small.
Blackmail
We have assumed that the politician aliates with one group before bids are submitted. But since the aliation is valuable to the groups, why do they not oer to pay the politician to aliate with them? Or to put it dierently -why does not the politician accept bids from both groups then decide with whom to aliate. Intuition suggests that this may be lucrative for the politician:
by telling each group if you do not give me a good bid I will pass the other group's agenda and you will be really sorry each group will be willing to pay a great deal. On the other hand since groups may wind up paying more than the agenda is worth to them -the value to themselves plus the value to the other group -engaging in this type of political blackmail may be dangerous for the politician: the groups do not much like this and may collude to get rid of the politician. Here
we consider a simple model that allows for the possibility both of blackmail and of removal of the politician.
We now elaborate the lobbying game form as follows:
1. The politician either chooses a group a ∈ {S, L} to aliate with (called as before the agenda setter) or he does not -in which case we say he chooses to be opportunistic.
2. Each group chooses either to attempt removal of the politician, to block removal of the politician or to remain neutral. To attempt removal or block removal incurs a small cost which we model as a lexicographic preference for remaining neutral in case of indierence.
3. If one group attempts removal of the politician and the other group does not block it the politician is removed, and everyone gets 0. Otherwise the game continues.
In case the politician is not removed the game continues:
4. If the politician has aliated with a group the agenda setting game of the previous section is played.
5. If the politician has chosen to be opportunistic each group k ∈ {S, L} proposes an agenda consisting of a transfer 0 ≤ V −k ≤ νN −k to be paid for by the other group and submits a bid 0 ≤ p k ≤ (1 − c)N k + ψβV −k . The politician designates a target group τ and submits a bid
6. If both groups bid zero the status quo remains. Otherwise, with probability α the price is the bid of the politician and with probability 1 − α it is the lowest bid. When the price is the bid of the politician τ wins if p τ ≥ p P ; if p τ < p P politician is not paid and −τ wins. When the price is the lowest bid the highest bidder wins and in case of a tie the target group wins.
7. The winning group has their agenda implemented and pays the price.
The notion of equilibrium is that in each subgame we must have Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies. We use two additional renements in addition to the lexicographic tiebreaking rule about removing the politician already mentioned. The rst has to do with bids. In the blackmail subgame demands and bids are submitted simultaneously. This means that weak dominance has no bite. Recall that in a second-price auction there are many equilibria. For example: the loser might bid zero and the winner bid the loser's willingness to pay -in which case the winner gets the item for free. This is ordinarily ruled out through weak dominance. We cannot do so in the blackmail game, so we instead assume that the equilibrium must be robust to a small probability of the other bid being random which we model as assuming that conditional on the equilibrium demand of the other group and the own demand each group does in fact bid their willingness to pay and the politician targets the group with the highest willingness to pay and bids that amount. Second, the loser of the auction is indierent to the demand. This raises an issue similar to that in bidding: there are many equilibria some in which the loser demands little and some in which the loser bids much. This is not reasonable if there is a small chance that your demand -perhaps being recognized as being just by the political system -will be accepted.
In that case when indierent you should also make the highest possible demand in case it should be accepted. So as an additional renement we assume that when indierent the highest demand must always be made. These renements lead to a unique outcome.
Note incidentally that we assume that the politician does not submit his bid after the demands are known, which would put the winner in the position of a Stackelberg leader being able to shave his demand to pay less to the politician. The politician has incentive to commit to his bid simultaneously to avoid this.
One issue: why not assume that the game is sequential move? That is, rst demands are submitted then observing the demand of the other group bids are submitted. However, from a descriptive point of view it seems to us most likely that given the politician is taking bids, the groups say here is what I want and here is what I will pay rather than here is what I want, and we'll argue later over what I'll pay. Second, as we will see, in the simultaneous move game the politician gets the most possible in any extensive form, hence has no reason to prefer a dierent mechanism.
We should also acknowledge that with the renements described above the simultaneous move game is much easier to analyze than the sequential move game.
Blackmail Equilibrium
In Appendix 2 we prove Theorem 3. The only cases in which the politician chooses to be opportunistic are in the nonfungible case if
in which case the large group wins; and in the fungible case if β > 1 − c and
in which case the small group wins. When the politician is opportunistic each group proposes the maximum possible V −k = νN −k and bids the maximum possible (1 − c)N k + ψβνN −k . In the remaining cases the politician aliates with a group and the result is as in Theorem 2.
Overall the result is not terribly dierent than the main result -with non-fungible prizes favoring the large group and fungible prizes favoring the small group. It is interesting in the non-fungible case to contrast the condition for blackmail and the large group winning
with the condition for the large group winning when there is no blackmail
We see that the former condition always implies the latter, so that the possibility of blackmail does not additionally favor the large group, but rather when the stakes βν are moderate the large group wins and is not blackmailed, but when the stakes are large enough the politician will turn to blackmail. The less eective is the politician at bargaining (the smaller is α) the lower the stakes for which the politician will turn to blackmail. Put dierently, blackmail by the politician enables him to attain a greater share if he is an ineectual bargainer -but since he cannot commit to a modest demand, blackmail is only useful if he is unable to make a large demand. Basically the same circumstances which favor the large group are also likely to lead to blackmail.
By contrast blackmail is not so likely over fungible issues. If β < 1 − c it will never occur.
Otherwise it is large values of N L /N S which both favor the small group without blackmail and are likely to lead to blackmail.
Discussion
The model has several implications. First, fungible prizes are more favorable to small groups than non-fungible prizes. Second, a small group should not be too greedy in agenda setting. Third, a higher xed cost is more favorable to the small group. The world is a complicated place with many issues and in addition to lobbying where there are xed costs that favor smaller groups, political decisions are also inuenced by voting which as Levine and Mattozi (2016) show is more favorable to large groups. Moreover many political decisions are made by courts, and while these decisions are inuenced by political calculations and lobbying the mechanism does not match that described in our model. Never-the-less it is useful to ask whether the complicated world reects in a broad sense the general implications of the model. Some rough back-of-the-envelope calculations
show that there is promise in this direction.
One place to look is to see how political decisions reect public opinion. Do decisions favoring a group have substantial public support or limited public support? The model suggests that for fungible prizes widespread public support is not so important while for non-fungible prizes it is.
Two signicant non-fungible issues have been civil rights for blacks and civil rights for gays. In both cases signicant advances have occurred when public support has become widespread.
Long term polling by Gallup 9 asks about willingness to vote for a black person for President, 9 www.gallup.com/poll/3400/longterm-gallup-poll-trends-portrait-american-public-opinion.aspx Again the recognition of rights -non-fungible as it is -seems to have followed public opinion and indeed, majority public opinion.
By contrast if we look at an important fungible issue -farm subsidies -we see that support for large farms which receive the bulk of subsidies has only 15% popular support. 11 While there are only about 2 million farms in the US it is not just farmers that benet from farm subsidies.
An upper bound should be the rural population of the US of about 60 million people or roughly 20 million households out of the 120 million U.S. households -which is also about 15%. So we see that a minority of roughly 15% is eective at getting a fungible prize from the remaining 85%.
This number 15% is similar to the fraction of the population that is either black or gay -yet those groups have been ineectual in realizing the non-fungible prize of civil rights until they achieved the support of roughly a majority.
Another way to get a handle on the eectiveness of small groups in competing for fungible prizes to to look at how many of them there are. For example, the Italian yellow pages for example list 21,788 associations sindacali e di categoria. These groups -largely trade unions -have two main functions: they negotiate with rms over contracts and they lobby government for favors. If we look at the geographical distribution of these groups we can get an idea of the relative importance of these two functions. In Rome there are almost 1500 groups, in Milan around 1000 and in Bologna about 400. Looking at GDP, we see that Lombardia (the region of Milan) produces twice that of Lazio (where Rome is), and Emilia Romagna (containing Bologna) 20% less than Lazio. seems that perhaps as many as 1000 of these groups are primarily lobbying for fungible benets from the Italian government and bureaucracy. Needless to say this is a large number of lobbying groups and all represent a relatively small number of people. In a similar vein we notice that in the U.S. there are around 10,000 registered lobbyists.
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It is the presence of a xed cost per member that prevents a large group from being eective.
But is the level of xed cost needed to explain the data plausible? Since data are readily available let us examine farm subsidies in the U.S.
14 As we observed, N L is about 85% and N S is about 15% of households, so that N L is indeed much larger than N One estimate of the annual value of bribes received by top Chinese ocials is the increase in their wealth -$11.5 billion. China currently is of similar size in total real GDP as the U.S. Suppose that the portion of the economy subject to discretionary transfers in China is similar in size to the U.S.
agricultural sector. Then $11.5 billion in bribes is consistent with the idea that U.S. agricultural subsidies are commensurate with the overall size of favors paid by government ocials -this would imply a substantial α although -since there are sectors other than agriculture -considerably less than 50%. politicians. This suggests that in the U.S. α is quite small, less than 5%.
Turning to the bigger picture: the theory suggests that cost of ineciency (1 − β)cN L depends on fundamentals and not on bargaining power α which simply determines how much politicians walk away with. Seen this way, while the evidence is in favor of a much higher α in China than in the U.S. -the theory says that from an allocational point of view -the amount of inecient transfers -it may not make much dierence. Notice, by the way, the fact that α is clearly much higher in China than the U.S. is suggestive that in societies that are more extractive in the sense of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) politicians have more bargaining power. Going back to Mancur Olson: his original idea that small groups are stronger does not take account of the fact that groups face budget constraints. These constraints vary considerably depending on whether the transfer groups seek is fungible or not -and this has a big impact on group behavior. When the prize is fungible small groups have a signicant advantage over large ones as
Olson suggests. When the prize is not fungible larger groups are advantaged provided they can extract enough value from the small group. This may explain the apparent paradox that when it comes to special nancial favors small groups seem very eective, but when it comes to large non-nancial issues -such as minority rights -large groups are more eective. [Theorem 2 in the text] If the large group has a winning agenda the optimal agenda is νN S ; if the small group has a winning agenda its optimal agenda is cN L .
In the fungible case: if β ≤ N S /N L both groups opt out; otherwise the politician aliates with the small group.
Proof. We study optimal agendas and the politician's choice. Instead of willingness to pay which involves constraints based on the size of the group, whether the group is an agenda setter, and the fungibility of the prize, it is useful to ignore the constraints and consider the desire to pay. For the agenda setter a this is βV −a − cN a and for the non-agenda setter this is V −a − cN −a . Both are increasing in V −a but the desire of the non-agenda setter increases more rapidly. Dene the crossover pointV −a ≡ c(N −a − N a )/(1 − β) as the point where the two desires are equal. To the right of this point the non-agenda setter has a higher desire. This means that if the constraints on his ability to pay do not bind he is at least as willing to pay as the agenda-setter. To the left of the crossover point the same is true of the agenda setter. We can also dene the payo point In case a = L the crossover pointV −a < 0 and so the large group has a winning agenda if and
Note that in the fungible case this is impossible.
In the case of the small group the crossover point is positive, so we must analyze the left of the crossover point. The small group will not propose any agenda below the payo pointṼ L = cN S /β.
There are two cases depending on which ofV L orṼ L is larger. Notice thatV L ≤Ṽ L may be written
IfV L ≤Ṽ L then there is no winning agenda for the small group below the crossover point, so the small group is in the same boat as the large group: it has a winning agenda if and only if the transfer is fungible β > (1 − c) + cN S /N L . However this is inconsistent with β ≤ N S /N L so the small group has no winning agenda.
For β ≤ N S /N L we now have the complete picture. In the non-fungible case the small group has no winning agenda, and the large group has a winning agenda if and only if βν
which case the large group submits the winning agenda V S = νN S . In the fungible case neither group has a winning agenda.
We now analyze the remaining case
is no winning agenda to propose. Otherwise to small group is willing to propose an agenda to the right of the payo point. Observe that the large group bids zero if and only if V L ≤ cN L and note that cN L >Ṽ L = βcN S . So there there is no point in proposing an agenda less than cN L = min{cN L , νN L }. Since c < ν so that larger agendas are feasible then the willingness to pay of the large group rises faster than the small group as long as the large group is not constrained. Hence either the small group should propose cN L or should propose enough that the constraint binds, in which case it is optimal to propose νN L . However, in the non-fungible case if the constraint binds on the large group then the small group cannot win the bidding. In the fungible case proposing
It can be checked the the former is always larger than the latter, so that in all cases the optimal winning agenda for the small group is cN L .
That covers the fungible case as we already know that the large group has no winning agenda in that case. In the non-fungible case if βν ≤ (1 − c) + cN L /N S the large group has no winning agenda so the politician aliates with the small group provided βν > cN S /N L so that the small group has a winning agenda. Otherwise the large group will propose the agenda V S = νN S resulting in the This implies that the large group agenda is strictly preferred by the politician.
Appendix 2: Proof of the Blackmail Theorem
Theorem.
[Theorem 3 in the text] The only cases in which the politician chooses to be opportunistic are in the non-fungible case if
in which case the small group wins. When the politician is opportunistic each group proposes the maximum possible V −k = νN −k and bid the maximum possible (1 − c)N k + ψβνN −k . In the remaining cases the politician aliates with a group and the result is as in Theorem 2.
Non-fungible case.
Lemma 3. In the non-fungible case the opportunistic politician remains in oce if and only if
in which case the large group wins. The politician chooses opportunism if he is able to remain in oce.
Proof. The large group equilibrium bid is (1−c)N L and the small group equilibrium bid is (1−c)N S so the winner is the large group who pays (1 − α)(1 − c)N S + α(1 − c)N L and gets βνN S − cN L .
Hence the net utility of winning for the large group is βνN S −cN L −(1−c)[(1−α)N S +αN L ]. When this is strictly negative the politician is removed the small group being indierent. The condition for the politician to remain in oce is therefore that this be non-negative, which may be rewritten in which case the small group wins. The politician chooses opportunism if he is able to remain in oce.
Proof. In the fungible case recall that ν = 1 so that the large group equilibrium bid is (1 − c)N L + βN S and the small group equilibrium bid is (1 − c)N S + βN L . The condition that the small group equilibrium bid is larger is 1 − c − β < 0 or β > 1 − c. There are three cases. 
